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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the market structure of Vietnam’s banking sector during 1999–2009, which is after 
the introduction of the two-tier banking system, using the non-structural (Panzar-Rosse) model. We 
consider a more comprehensive range of specifications, in terms of a greater number of environmental 
covariates and different dependent variables, than in previous applications of this model. Further, this 
is the first study that uses lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity), excludes assets (to avoid 
specification bias) and includes a lagged dependent variable (to avoid dynamic panel bias) in such a 
study of the Vietnamese banking system. We find that the Vietnamese banking system operates in 
monopoly. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of the degree of market competition in the Vietnamese 
banking system using the Panzar and Rosse (1987) non-structural model. This model suggests that the 
market is a monopoly if the service offered by a particular bank is independent and originate. In contrast, 
the market is competitive if bank services are similar in the market. We apply the non-structural model 
to an extensive panel data set of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks, which includes state owned 
commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks, from 1999 to 2009. Using this procedure we 
consider whether the Vietnamese banking market is best characterised by monopoly, perfect 
competition or the intermediate case of monopolistic competition.  
 
We estimate H-statistics of models that both include assets and exclude assets with current or lagged 
input prices. We also estimate E-statistics to test whether the long-run equilibrium conditions required 
for the H-statistics to be valid hold when using the fixed-effects estimator within the equilibrium 
approach. A comparison of models using current and lagged input prices is employed to assess whether 
input prices are endogenous. This is the first study that uses lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) 
and excludes assets (to avoid bias) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system. This study also extends 
the previous literature (Bikker et al., 2006a, 2006b and Bikker and Spierdijk, 2009) by considering new 
additional variables such as total assets, capital/assets, loans/deposits and the number of branches in 
the model’s specification. In addition, we compare inference using four alternative dependent variables 
being revenue/assets, interest income/assets, revenue and interest income. However, the main 
contribution of this paper is to determine the market structure in the recent period after the Vietnamese 
banking system has transformed into a less centralised two-tier system. Our study is the first to uniquely 
identify the market structure of this developing economy’s banking system (using data only for Vietnam 
and not observations from other countries) in a post-transition period.3 Another novelty of the paper is 
to assess the biases that arise from model misspecification, in particular, biases dues to endogeneity, 
including assets and not accounting for a potential dynamic specification. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 deals with developments in the Vietnamese 
banking system in the period from 1986 to 2009; section 3 provides a literature review of the non-
                                                 
3 The few previous studies that have sought to determine Vietnam’s market structure have done so in an earlier period when less of the 
transition had taken place and have assumed homogeneity of the Vietnamese banking system’s market structure with the other countries 
analysed. 
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structural model in banking; section 4 discusses methodology and data; section 5 presents our empirical 
results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Vietnamese banking system during 1986-2009 
 
From 1986 to 2009 the Vietnamese banking system was transformed from a mono to two-tier banking 
system. The two-tier banking system has the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) as the central bank (tier 1) 
and four specialised state owned banks (tier 2). Table 1 shows the number of Vietnamese commercial 
banks from 1990 to 2009. With extended networks in almost all provinces and larger cities, state owned 
commercial banks have a competitive edge in providing banking services. Although joint stock 
commercial banks increased their numbers immediately after their appearance in 1990 (in 2009 there 
were 37 joint stock commercial banks), the leading positions in the market still belong to state owned 
commercial banks. State owned commercial banks were originally sector departments under the State 
Bank of Vietnam, with specified lending programmes to state owned enterprises which were based on 
government policies.  
 
Non-state owned commercial banks consist of joint stock commercial banks, branches of foreign banks, 
joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial banks4. Unlike state owned commercial banks 
a number of joint stock commercial banks make profits due to good performance. Joint stock 
commercial banks have achieved average returns on equity between 15 per cent and 30 per cent. Being 
less than 15 years old joint stock commercial banks are relatively young and they can be divided into 
three groups: (1) the top five large urban banks; (2) a smaller group of banks that are either growing 
rapidly or have established a niche; and (3) 12 small rural joint stock commercial banks. The top five 
urban banks are Techcombank, Sacombank, VIBBank, Asia Commercial Bank, and East Asia Commercial 
Bank. The smaller urban joint stock commercial banks include Viet A Bank and Saigon Bank. Small rural 
commercial banks were all transformed into city commercial banks at the end of 2010, such as An Binh 
Bank and Saigon-Hanoi Bank. These banks developed throughout the country, not just in rural areas and 
with help from big business and foreign investors they also performed well in the 2000s. The number of 
branches of foreign banks increased from 18 banks in 1995 to 48 banks in 2009. However, each foreign 
                                                 
4 Foreign commercial banks normally transformed out of branches of foreign banks. Data on assets, loans and deposits of branches of 
foreign banks are very small compared to other banks. Therefore, in our application non-state owned commercial banks consist of joint 
stock commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and one foreign commercial bank.  
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bank normally has one branch in either Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City. Hence, their assets, loans and deposits 
are very small compared to state owned commercial banks, joint stock commercial banks and joint 
venture commercial banks. Despite Foreign Direct Investment in US dollar terms growing by a factor of 
eight between 1990 and 2005, foreign companies are still hesitant as whether or not to choose domestic 
banks when they enter this new market. The number of joint venture commercial banks has increased 
slightly from four to six banks between 1995 and 2009. The first foreign commercial bank (being HSBC) 
had a license to set up a wholly foreign-owned bank from 2008 (see Nguyen and Stewart, 2013). 
 
Table 2 shows data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese 
banking system (state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 to 
2009. On the whole, there was an increasing trend of loans, assets, deposits and capital over the period. 
Vietnamese banks were burdened by a high volume of non-performing loans, particularly during the 
1990s, however, these generally decreased from 1999 to 2009. Non-performing loans of non-state 
owned commercial banks are typically lower than those of state owned commercial banks.  
 
In terms of regulation, the State Bank of Vietnam aims to create a banking supervision development 
(following Basel) from 2010 onwards. Meanwhile, the coverage, measures and procedures of banking 
supervision and monitoring are to be reformed in accordance with the development of internet 
technologies and banking technology. This will be done by applying key principles of international 
standards on banking supervision (Basel I and Basel II). The old capital adequacy ratio standards for 
banks in Basel I and Basel II are 8 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively. The capital adequacy ratio for 
the Vietnamese commercial banks is to be adjusted to 9 per cent (as Circular No. 13/TT-NHNN dated 
20th May 2010 of the State Bank of Vietnam). 
 
In parallel with the speed of the country’s economic development, the loan growth rate rose 
dramatically. One of the reasons was that many banks had greatly increased their credit growth through 
real estate loans, due to the over-heating of the real estate market. The credit growth rate of the banking 
system increased to nearly 38 per cent in 2007 and peaked at an alarming 63 per cent in the first quarter 
of 2008 (WB, 2008: 3). This has been the highest growth rate within the past decade. When the inflation 
rate and trade balance deficit had become more serious, the government applied a traditional tightening 
of monetary policy in order to reduce money supply circulation, which affected the banking system. 
Compulsory measures were necessary for banks to reorganise and strengthen their organisations.  
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3. Literature review 
 
Empirical studies that use the non-structural model to establish the extent of contestability in banking 
markets are concerned with drawing inferences about market structure indirectly from observing 
conduct. This is because of contestability, which depends on the extent of potential competition, is not 
observable directly (Goddard et al., 2001). Panzar and Rosse (1987) formulated simple models for 
monopolistic, oligopolistic and perfectly competitive markets, and develop a test to discriminate 
between these market structures. Bikker and Bos (2008) explained this non-structural model as based 
on the properties of a reduced-form revenue equation at the firm or bank level and using the H-statistic, 
which, under certain assumptions, can serve as a measure of how competitive banks are. The test is 
from a general banking model, which determines equilibrium output and the equilibrium number of 
banks by maximizing profits at both the bank level and the industry level. This implies, first, that bank i 
maximises its profits, where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The profit maximising condition is: 
 
0),,('),,('  iiiiii TnYCZnYR  (1) 
 
Ri refers to revenue, Ci to cost, Yi to output, wi to a vector of m factor input prices, and Zi and Ti to vectors 
of exogenous variables that shift the bank’s revenue and cost functions, respectively. The sub index i 
refers to bank i; n is the number of banks; and the prime symbol denotes a first derivative with respect 
to output. Second, at the market level, it means that, in equilibrium, the zero supernormal profit 
constraint holds: 
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Variables marked with an asterisk (*) represent equilibrium values. Market power is measured by the 
extent to which a change in factor input prices (dwk,i) for k = 1,..., m is reflected in changes in equilibrium 
revenue (dR*i), earned by bank i (where m denotes the number of input prices). Panzar and Rosse (1987) 
defined a measure of competition H as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function 
with respect to factor prices: 
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The first market model that Panzar and Rosse investigate is a monopoly. In their analysis, monopoly 
includes the case of price-taking competitive banks, as long as the prices they face are truly exogenous, 
that is, as long as their equilibrium values are unaffected by changes in the other exogenous variables 
in the model. The empirical refutation of monopoly constitutes a rejection of the assumption that the 
revenue of the banks in question is independent of the decisions made by their actual or potential rivals. 
The Panzar and Rosse model demonstrates that under monopoly, an increase in input prices will 
increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output and subsequently reduce revenue; hence H will be 
zero or negative. In the case of monopolistic competition, the analysis is based on the comparative static 
properties of the Chamberlain equilibrium model. In the equilibrium condition, interdependence affects 
the structural revenue function, and the bank’s profit finally becomes zero as the conditions of entry 
and withdrawal are unlimited; hence H will be smaller than one. In the case of perfect competition, 
under certain conditions both marginal cost and average cost increase without changing the optimum 
amount of the individual bank’s output. If this condition occurs and some banks withdraw from the 
market, the remaining banks would individually face increased demand. This increased demand leads 
to higher prices and revenue, which is equal to the increase of cost, and H will become one. In summary: 
 
 H ≤ 0: indicates a monopoly. 
 0 < H < 1: indicates the intermediate case of monopolistic competition. 
 H = 1: indicates a perfectly competitive industry. 
 
Shaffer (1982) obtained 0 < H < 1 for a sample of unit banks in the New York banking sector, suggesting 
monopolistic competition. Nathan and Neaven (1989) confirmed this result for New York banks even 
when the effect of loan losses is considered. Nathan and Neaven (1989) tested for contestability for a 
group of Canadian banks, trust companies and mortgage companies with data for the period from 1982 
to 1984. The result indicated 0 < H < 1. DeBandt and Davis (2000) provided a significant improvement 
on the specification of variables employed in the model and its functional form. They emphasised that 
the banking industry is not a general industry, like manufacturing, rather it is an industry with individual 
characteristics, which is in line with the argument of Panzar and Rosse (1987). They obtained 0 < H < 1 
for France, Germany, Italy and the US. Competition appears to be most intense in the US while small 
banks are found to enjoy some monopoly power in the German and French markets.  
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The model used for calculating the H-statistic has taken a variety of specific forms in the general banking 
literature. Molyneux et al. (1994) and Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) employed the ratio of interest 
revenue to the total balance sheet as an endogenous variable. Molyneux et al. (1994) investigated major 
European banking markets between 1986 and 1989 and they suggested that banks in Germany, the UK, 
France and Spain were in monopolistic competition during this period whereas banks in Italy behave as 
if in monopoly. Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) used data on 892 banks from 15 EU countries over the 
sample period 1989-1996. Their results show that European banking sectors operate under conditions 
of monopolistic competition. On the other hand, Nathan and Neave (1989) used the logarithm of 
interest revenue as the dependent variable. According to DeBandt and Davis (2000), this is the most 
appropriate measure since the ratio of interest revenue to total assets might be interpreted as yielding 
a price equation rather than a revenue function. However, homogeneity might be induced even in the 
logarithmic specification. DeBandt and Davis (2000) insisted that in empirical studies on banking 
competition, although cross-sectional results are generally employed, the implicit assumption is that all 
banks have access to the same factor market and only the scale of operations differ. They argued that 
the dimension of the time-series is crucial, and that irregular results might arise from estimating a cross-
sectional regression of the equation with Ordinary Least Squares for every year (t=1, …T). As a result, 
they asserted that it is desirable to focus on the pooled sample regression.  
 
In Vietnam, three previous studies have applied the Panzar-Rosse model to the Vietnamese banking 
system. Bikker et al. (2006a, 2006b) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2009) analysed bank structure in the world 
(with 101 countries including Vietnam) from 1986-2004. Due to data constraints, they only investigated 
banking structure in Vietnam from 1991 to 2004 for 24 banks.5 They calculated the H-statistic for the 
Vietnamese banking system as 0.74. However, they applied only one model for all 101 countries, 
including Vietnam, and this model did not reflect the actual business in Vietnam where state owned 
commercial banks still dominate the whole banking system. Further, they could not observe the three 
input prices directly. Therefore, they used the ratio of annual personal expenses to total assets as an 
approximation for the price of personal expenses, and the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed 
assets as a proxy for the price of capital expenditure. Moreover, Bikker et al. (2006a, 2006b) and Bikker 
and Spierdijk (2009) preferred interest income as the dependent variable, while other researchers, such 
                                                 
5 The total number of observations for Vietnam that they use is only 135 whereas our maximum sample size is 376 observations. 
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as Nathan and Neave (2001), favour using revenue in the Panzar-Rosse model. Hence, for comparison 
purposes we will use both interest income and revenue as dependent variables in this paper. 
 
Our data set includes 48 Vietnamese commercial banks over the period 1999 to 2009. This is the first 
time that such an extensive panel data set has been employed to uniquely identify the Vietnamese 
banking system’s market structure using the non-structural model (our maximum sample period is 376 
observations). No previous study has used lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) and excluded 
assets (to avoid bias) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system. Environmental factors such as total 
assets, capital/assets, loans/deposits and the number of branches are incorporated in our models and 
have not all been employed in previous studies of Vietnam. In addition, for comparative purposes, we 
use the following four different dependent variables: revenue divided by total assets (REV/TA); interest 
income divided by total assets (INT/TA); revenue (REV); and interest income (INT). We use the non-
structural model to determine whether the Vietnamese banking system is best characterised by 
monopoly, monopolistic competition or perfect competition.  
 
4. Methodology and data 
 
4.1. Calculating H-statistics 
 
We estimate non-structural models based on the Panzar-Rosse specification using the following 
empirical form: 
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Laeven, 2004; Gelos and Roldos, 2004: 50 and Nathan and Neave, 2001: 580). 
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,  is the loans to deposits ratio; LN(TAi,t) is the natural logarithm of total assets and 
LN(BRi,t) is the natural logarithm of the number of branches. 
 
The H-statistic, which is used to determine the degree of competition, is calculated from (4) using: 
 
321  H  (5) 
 
From equation (5), if H ≤ 0 the market is a monopoly, if 0 < H < 1 the market is in monopolistic 
competition and if H = 1 the market is in perfect competition.  
 
4.2. Models with and without assets 
 
Many previous empirical studies include among the controls the log of assets, )( ,tiTALN , to measure 
size or some other similarly defined measure of bank size; and many studies also scale the dependent 
variables with total assets, that is: )(
,
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LN . However, Bikker et al. (2006a) pointed 
out that it is incorrect to estimate a revenue elasticity using a specification that includes a quantity-type 
variable among the controls, or using a specification which, through rescaling, converts a revenue 
variable into a price-type variable. In fact, if )( ,tiTALN appears among the controls, then it is immaterial 
whether the dependent variable is unscaled (not divided by total assets) or scaled (divided by total 
assets). In either case, the coefficients on the factor input prices (𝛿1, 𝛿2, 𝛿3) should be interpreted as 
output price elasticities and not as revenue elasticities. The model is misspecified if assets are included 
and inference regarding market structure is invalid. Hence, on the left-hand side of the models, the 
dependent variables should be )( ,tiREVLN and )( ,tiINTLN instead of )(
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respectively. Further, )( ,tiTALN should be removed from the right-hand side of the models (Goddard 
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and Wilson, 2009).6 The valid unscaled model (that we also estimate) is obtained from (4) with 𝛿6 = 0 
and using the unscaled dependent variables, )( ,tiREVLN  and )( ,tiINTLN . 
 
4.3. Calculating E-statistics (testing equilibrium) 
 
For the H-statistic to be a valid test it must be calculated on observations that are in long-run 
equilibrium. This suggests that competitive capital markets will equalise risk-adjusted rates of return 
across banks such that, in equilibrium, rates of returns should not be significantly correlated with input 
prices (Classens and Laeven, 2004; Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994; Matthews et al., 2007; Molyneux and 
Forbes, 1995 and Shaffer, 1982). Thus, in the context of the theory of competitiveness and contestability 
set out in (4) we specify a model for the determination of whether equilibrium holds. This is obtained 
by replacing the dependent variable in (4) with profit before tax on assets (1+PBT/TA) thus: 7 
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(6) 
 
A version of (6) without  is also estimated by setting 06  . 
 
The E-statistic that is used for testing whether the market is in equilibrium is defined as: 
 
321  E  (7) 
 
We test whether E = 0 using an F-test. If rejected, the market is not in equilibrium (Claessens and Laeven, 
2004), whereas if E = 0 the market is in equilibrium and the H-statistic calculated using (4) and (5) is 
valid. 
 
4.4. Models with current and lagged input prices 
 
Simultaneity is a dual direction of causality in a system of equations which violates the assumption that 
the explanatory variables and equation’s error term are uncorrelated. Variables in a regression can 
                                                 
6 In this study, we estimate models that both include and exclude assets for comparison purposes.  
7 Because profit before tax can take on small (negative) values, we compute the dependent variable as (1+PBT/TA). 
 
)( ,tiTALN
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violate this assumption for several reasons, including omitted variable bias, measurement error and 
simultaneity/reverse causation. In our regression, the models including the current values of input 
prices might suffer from simultaneity (endogeneity) bias between input prices and the dependent 
variables (revenue and interest income). We assess whether or not one or more of the input prices 
(LN(IE/FF), LN(PE/TE) and LN(CE/FA)) suffers from endogeneity by comparing regressions that include 
current input prices and regressions that include lagged input prices - see Shaffer (2004) and Goddard 
and Wilson (2009). To obtain models using lagged input prices the current price variables are replaced 
by their values lagged one time period in (4) and (6). Large differences in the estimated coefficients (and 
therefore H-statistics and E-statistics) using models with current input prices and using models with 
lagged input prices is taken as an indication of the endogeneity. If endogeneity appears evident 
inference from models that incorporate lagged input prices is preferred. 
 
4.5. Model estimation 
 
Econometric problems may arise from estimating equation (4) using panel data including the process 
being dynamic, with current realisations of the dependent variable being influenced by its past values, 
and that the idiosyncratic disturbances may have individual-specific patterns of heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation. To address these issues a generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator, such as 
that introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) and those discussed by Roodman (2009), may be used 
when lagged dependent variables are added. The difference and system GMM estimators can be applied 
using either the one-step method or the two-step method.   
 
After experimentation to find a valid specification we report the results from the one-step system GMM 
estimator with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust coefficient standard errors (results from 
the other estimators are available upon request).  
 
The pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimators applied to a model that includes a lagged dependent 
variable and that should allow for cross-sectional fixed-effects have the following properties. The 
(pooled) OLS estimator that excludes fixed-effects will be inconsistent when T is small (even when N is 
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large) and the lagged dependent variable’s coefficient will be upwards biased. 8 The fixed-effects 
estimator will also be inconsistent when T is small and there is a downward bias in the lagged dependent 
variable’s coefficient. Since the bias on the lagged dependent variable for the pooled OLS and fixed-
effects estimators are in the opposite direction we expect the true coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable to fall in between these two estimators’ values.9  
 
When using GMM, Hansen’s J-statistic is employed to assess whether the instruments are exogenous 
whilst allowing for heteroscedastic and autocorrelated disturbances.10 Since this test is biased towards 
accepting that the instruments are exogenous as the number of instruments increases we follow 
Roodman’s (2009) recommendation and ensure that the number of instruments is less than the number 
of cross-sections in the panel to help guard against this potential problem.  
 
4.6. Data 
 
In this paper, annual individual balance sheets and income statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial 
banks from 1999 to 2009 have been collected from the State Bank of Vietnam, National Library of 
Vietnam and individual banks. Although the number of banks for which there is data is only half of the 
total in the Vietnamese banking system they account for more than 90 per cent of total customer loans, 
total customer deposits and total assets.11  
 
5. Empirical results 
 
Table 3 reports the non-structural model estimated for the full sample using the fixed-effects estimator. 
The results include estimated revenue equations (in the column headed “H-statistics”) and profit 
                                                 
8 The GMM estimators assume small T and large N in the panel. Hence, the GMM estimators are consistent as N tends to infinity and not 
as T tends to infinity. When T is large, dynamic models using the pooled OLS or fixed-effects estimators are consistent meaning that there 
is little benefit from using GMM (which can become unreliable when T is large due to the overfitting of endogenous variables). 
9 In our application T is small and we expect both the OLS and fixed-effects estimators to be biased. 
10 In the application of GMM, the Sargan test has a null hypothesis of “the instruments as a group are exogenous”. Therefore, the higher 
is the p-value of the Sargan statistic the better the result is. In robust estimation, Stata reports the Hansen statistic instead of the Sargan 
test and both tests have the same null hypothesis. The Arellano – Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation 
and is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for AR(2) in first differences is important because it will detect autocorrelation in levels. 
These models are valid when these tests’ p-values are higher than 0.05 (see Roodman, 2009). 
11 Five of the 48 banks are state owned commercial banks, five are joint stock commercial banks, one is a foreign commercial bank and the 
remaining 37 are joint stock commercial banks. Several banks established in 2008 and 2009 are included in the data. The number of records 
ranged from a low of 17 banks in 1999 to a high of 46 in 2009. Banks also have differing frequencies of years in the data – see Table 1. 
There are 16 banks with data for all years; 12 banks with 4–8 years of data; 14 banks with 5–7 years of data and five banks with 2–4 years 
of data (of which three banks were established in 2008 and one bank was founded in 2006). Only one bank (which was transformed from 
a branch of a foreign bank to a foreign commercial bank in 2008) has one year of data.  
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equations (in the column headed “E-statistics”) using all measures of the dependent variable with 
current or lagged input prices both with and without assets. 10H  refers to the F-test of the null hypothesis 
that cross-sectional fixed-effects are redundant. 20H  refers to the F-test of the null hypothesis that both 
cross-sectional and time-period fixed-effects are redundant. All of the F-tests reject the exclusion of 
cross-sectional and period fixed-effects, therefore, the ‘2-way-FE’ model is favoured and reported in the 
table. 12 We also report R2, the adjusted R2 (Adj R2), the statistic for testing the null hypothesis that R2 = 
0 (F-statistic) and the number of observations.  
 
The H-statistic is reported in the row labelled H-sta. in the table. The H-statistics are 0.59 (with 
LN(REV/TA) as the dependent variable) and 0.62 (with LN(INT/TA)) in the models with assets and with 
current input prices. The rows below the H-statistics show the result of t-tests for the null hypotheses 
that H = 0 and H = 1. The H-statistics are significantly different from both zero and one in these models.  
When the H-statistic is between zero and one (as in this case), it indicates monopolistic competition. In 
the models without assets and with current input prices the H-statistics are 0.96 for the equation where 
LN(REV) is the dependent variable and 0.98 for the specification with LN(INT) as the regressand. They 
are both significantly different from zero and insignificantly different from one. Since 𝐻 ≅ 1 this 
indicates that the Vietnamese banking system is a competitive industry.13 Comparing the models with 
and without assets we notice that excluding total assets from the revenue equations has transformed 
our inference of the Vietnamese banking market from monopolistic competition to perfect competition. 
This is consistent with the prediction of Bikker et al. (2006a) and Goddard and Wilson (2009) because 
the downward bias in H is removed when assets are excluded.  
 
In the models with assets and with lagged input prices, the H-statistic is 0.16 when LN(REV/TA) is the 
dependent variable and 0.13 when LN(INT/TA) is the regressand. The null hypotheses that the H-statistic 
is zero or one are both rejected. This indicates that the industry is in monopolistic competition, if close 
to monopoly. Lastly, the H-statistics based upon revenue equations excluding assets that include lagged 
input prices as regressors are 0.45-0.43 (both are significantly different from zero and one, indicating 
monopolistic competition). Once again the models including assets have notably lower H-statistics than 
those excluding assets, this likely reflects the specification bias arising from the inclusion of assets. 
                                                 
12 ‘2-way-FE’ incorporates both cross-sectional and period fixed-effects. 
13 An increase in costs causes some banks to exit, prices to increase, and the revenue of the survivors to rise at the same rate as the increase 
in costs. 
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Further, these H-statistics are notably smaller than the corresponding equations that use current input 
prices, being 0.96-0.98. This difference is most likely due to simultaneity bias.14 Hence we favour the 
results using lagged input prices and without assets for inference and conclude that the Vietnamese 
banking system is in monopolistic competition.    
 
Table 3 also shows the results of the profit equations and their E-statistics for the full sample (in the 
column headed “E-statistics”). The E-statistic is used to determine whether the long-term equilibrium 
condition of the market is met. If the E-statistic is equal to zero the market is in long-term equilibrium 
whereas when the E-statistic is not equal to zero the market is not in long-term equilibrium. If the market 
is not in equilibrium the value of the H-statistic (obtained from the corresponding revenue equation) is 
temporal and the degree of competitiveness is changing through time. In this case, the estimated 
models are not valid for inference and it is appropriate to employ a dynamic model to determine the 
equilibrium value of the market. We use the ‘2-way-FE’ specification for inference because both cross-
section and time-period fixed-effects are jointly significant according to the 10H  and 
2
0H  F-tests. The E-
statistic in the ‘2-way-FE’ models are 0.007 (with assets and with current input prices), 0.006 (without 
assets and with current input prices), 0.007 (with assets and with lagged input prices) and 0.003 (without 
assets and with lagged input prices). In all cases, the null hypothesis that the Vietnamese banking system 
is in equilibrium is not rejected. Hence, all the corresponding H-statistics are valid. Due to simultaneity 
bias in the models using current input prices and the misspecification of the models that include assets 
(see, Bikker et al., 2006a; Goddard and Wilson, 2009) we favour the model without assets and with 
lagged input prices. Hence, the Vietnamese banking system is in long-run equilibrium (𝐸 ≅ 0.003 ) and 
characterised by monopolistic competition (𝐻 ≅ 0.43 − 0.45 ) during the period 1999 to 2009. 
 
We also note the following findings from the favoured models estimated over the full sample. The unit 
cost of funds (LN(IE/FF)) is positive and significant at the one per cent level for both dependent variables. 
The unit price of labour (LN(PE/TE)) is positive and significant at the 10 per cent level in the model where 
revenue is the dependent variable and insignificant when interest income is the regressand. The unit 
cost of fixed assets (LN(CE/FA)) is insignificant in the models with both dependent variables. These 
results suggest that the unit cost of funds has the most significant impact on revenue and interest 
                                                 
14 Unreported results (that are available from the authors upon request) using the Wu-Hausman test broadly confirm that current input 
prices are unlikely to be weakly exogenous. 
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income of the three input prices. These favoured specifications also indicate that customer loans over 
customer deposits (CL/CD) and total capital over total assets (TC/TA) are negative and significant while 
the number of branches (LN(BR)) is positive and significant.  
 
Table 4 reports the revenue equations estimated using the one-step system GMM estimator (for models 
excluding assets and including lagged input prices) over the full sample period. Time period fixed effects 
are included in both models (because F-tests reject their exclusion for both models) however the 
statistics relating to these variables are not reported to save space. To investigate misidentifying 
restrictions, we employ the Hansen (Sargan) test which indicates the null hypothesis that the population 
moment conditions are correct is not rejected as p=0.110>0.05 (where LN(REV) is dependent variable) 
and p=0.107>0.05 (where LN(INT) is dependent variable). The test for first-order serial correlation 
(probability values are reported in the row labelled AR(1) in Table 4) does not indicate whether the 
model is misspecified because first-order negative autocorrelation is expected when using panel GMM. 
Hence, our finding of evident first-order autocorrelation is expected and does not cause us to view either 
of the models given in Table 4 as invalid. We therefore follow conventional practice and focus on the 
test for second-order serial correlation to determine whether the model is valid or not (see Roodman, 
2009).15 The probability value for the test for second-order serial correlation (AR(2)) is 0.715 in the 
model where revenue is dependent variable and 0.757 in the model where interest income is dependent 
variable indicating no evident autocorrelation.  Hence, both models are considered valid for inference. 
Further, for both equations the lagged dependent variable is significant which indicates that these 
models estimated by GMM should be preferred to those using the fixed-effects estimators as reported 
in Table 3.  
 
Goddard and Wilson (2009, pp. 2285 – 2286) provided simulation evidence that the difference GMM 
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), in a model with a lagged dependent variable, is better at 
identifying the H-statistic compared to the fixed-effects estimator (in a model without a lagged 
dependent variable) when the true coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is greater than zero, 
which is the case in our study.  
                                                 
15 “To test for autocorrelation aside from the fixed effects, the Arellano–Bond test is applied to the residuals in differences. Because Δvit 
[the difference of the current period error term] is mathematically related to Δvi,t−1 via the shared vi,t−1 term, negative first-order serial 
correlation is expected in differences and evidence of it is uninformative. Thus to check for first-order serial correlation in levels, we look 
for second-order correlation in differences, on the idea that this will detect correlation between the vi,t−1 in Δvit and the vi,t−2 in Δvi,t−2. 
In general, we check for serial correlation of order l in levels by looking for correlation of order l + 1 in differences.” Roodman (2009, p. 
119), our comments are given in squared parentheses. 
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Our estimated H-statistics based on the model estimated by fixed-effects (without assets and including 
lagged input prices) that imposes 07   are reported in Table 3 as 0.453 and 0.430. The H-statistics 
based on the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator that allows 07   are reported in Table 
4 as – 1.283 and – 2.984. We find that the fixed-effects estimates of the H-statistic are smaller in 
magnitude than the system GMM estimates, which is consistent with the bias predicted when 07  . 
Since our system GMM estimates of 7  reported in Table 4 are 0.75 and 0.83 and are significantly 
different from zero and positive this suggests that we would expect such a bias (this assumes that 
Goddard and Wilson’s (2009) results based on the difference GMM estimator are also valid for the 
system GMM estimator that we employ). That is, our results are consistent with the predictions of 
Goddard and Wilson (2009) in this respect. 
 
Goddard and Wilson (2009, p. 2285) also showed, via simulation, that as the true value of 7  approaches 
unity its difference GMM estimate becomes downward biased causing the H-statistic to be downward 
biased in absolute value. This in turn causes the test for the null hypothesis that the H-statistic is equal 
to one to be incorrectly sized.16 Our estimates of 7  by system GMM reported in Table 4 are 0.75 and 
0.83. If these estimates are regarded as sufficiently close to unity to cause bias it means that our H-
statistics are smaller in absolute value than they should be. Given that our H-statistics are negative this 
suggests that they are not as negative as they should be. This can only reinforce our conclusion of a 
negative H-statistic. It also means that the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the H-statistic is 
equal to one may not be as negative as it should be and it may be that our failure to reject this hypothesis 
for the equation where LN(INT) is the dependent variable is due to this bias. Hence, to the extent that 
our results are subject to such bias they serve to reinforce our inference that the Vietnamese banking 
system is monopolistic. 
 
The model with the dependent variable LN(REV) is reported in column 2 of Table 4. The H-statistic is 
negative (-1.28) and is not significantly different from zero however it is significantly different from one. 
                                                 
16 Goddard and Wilson (2009, p. 2285) suggested that the test for the null of the H-statistic being equal to unity will be oversized (suggesting 
that the null hypothesis will be rejected too often) when the true value of 
7  is close to one. This is because they only consider the 
situation when the sum of the input price coefficients, 
321   , is positive. However, when this sum is negative, as is the case for 
our estimates, the test will not reject the null as often as it should (because the H-statistic will not be as negative as it should be). 
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This equation suggests that the Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic over the period 1999 and 
2009. Regarding the input price coefficients, the logarithm of interest expense per total funds is negative 
and significant while personal expense per person and capital expense per fixed asset are insignificant. 
LN(BR) is positive and significant. All other variables (except the intercept and lagged dependent 
variable) are insignificant.  
 
The model where the dependent variable is LN(INT) is reported in column 3 of Table 4. The H-statistic is 
negative (-2.98) which, as is the case when LN(REV) is the dependent variable also indicates that 
Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic. However, because the H-statistic is not significantly 
different from either one or zero this statistic is not well determined and suggests caution with this 
interpretation. Nevertheless, since the point estimate of the H-statistic is negative and because the 
model with LN(REV) is well determined and clearly negative, we believe that the overall conclusion of a 
monopolistic Vietnamese banking system over the period 1999 to 2009 is convincing. 
 
We recall that the favoured models from Table 3 (that exclude assets and include lagged input prices) 
suggest that the Vietnamese banking system is in monopolistic competition. However, these models 
exclude a statistically significant lagged dependent variable and are therefore not valid. When the 
statistically significant lagged dependent variable is included, as is done in Table 4, the results suggest 
that the Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic. Hence, we have demonstrated that not accounting 
for this significant lagged dependent variable will bias the results and lead to inferring monopolistic 
competition when the banking system is monopolistic. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, the Panzar-Rosse model has been applied in order to investigate the degree of competition 
faced by cooperative financial institutions in Vietnam. Our paper makes the following contributions to 
the literature. First, our results are based upon the largest sample both in terms of the number of banks 
and total sample size compared to any previous study of non-structural models in the Vietnamese 
banking system and ours is the first to clearly isolate the market structure for Vietnam from other 
countries. Second, this study also extends the previous literature by considering new additional 
variables. Environmental factors such as total assets, capital/assets, loans/deposits and the number of 
branches that are incorporated in our models have not been employed in previous studies of Vietnam. 
18 
 
Further, we use four different dependent variables to provide comparative inference. Third, this is also 
the first study that considers the exclusion of assets (to avoid specification bias) and the inclusion of 
lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system. Fourth, we also 
compare the OLS/fixed-effects estimators with the GMM estimator (where the model includes a lagged 
dependent variable) for the Vietnamese banking system and find that choosing the most appropriate 
(GMM in our case) is important because it substantively changes the conclusions drawn. This represents 
a further novelty of our paper. The favoured OLS/fixed effect estimators suggest that the Vietnamese 
banking system is in monopolistic competition. However, incorrectly including assets and/or current 
input prices can affect the results and, in some cases, lead to the erroneous conclusion that the 
Vietnamese banking system is perfectly competitive. Furthermore, we found that accounting for a 
significant lagged dependent variable, as is achieved when using the GMM estimator, indicates that the 
Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic. Hence, not accounting for significant dynamics also biases 
inference. Our results illustrate the importance of correctly specifying the model to achieve the most 
reliable inference because all 3 market structures (perfect competition, monopolistic competition and 
monopoly) can be inferred depending upon which model is used. The significant coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable confirms the dynamic character of the model specifications for Vietnamese banks. 
Using the correctly specified model that uses lagged input prices, excludes assets and includes a lagged 
dependent variable suggests that the whole Vietnamese banking system is characterised by monopoly 
from 1999 to 2009.  
 
Our results for Vietnam are different from those for the EU countries found in previous works. Our 
results show that the Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic while other studies found that 
European banking sectors operate under conditions of monopolistic competition (Molyneux et al., 1994; 
Bikker and Groeneveld, 2000; Bikker et al., 2006a, 2006b and Bikker and Spierdijk, 2009). In Vietnam, 
three out of five state owned commercial banks accounted for 45 per cent of customer deposits, 41 per 
cent of total assets and 51 per cent of customer loans of the banking system in 2009 (see Nguyen and 
Stewart, 2013). From 1999 to 2009, five state owned commercial banks still dominated the whole 
banking system although non-state owned commercial banks exhibited greater overall technical 
efficiency than state owned commercial banks (see Stewart et al., 2016). 
 
A number of policy implications arise out of this paper. We argue that the monetary policy tightening 
that began in 2008 had a large impact on the banking system in terms of compulsory reserves, loans and 
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deposits. Generally, the banking system encounters many difficulties, resulting from the loss of balance 
in the source and use of funds, and the rapid increase in credit growth (see Nguyen and Stewart, 2013). 
Hence, macroeconomic policies from the State Bank of Vietnam should be used to simultaneously meet 
the high demand of loans from the public and to control rising inflation brought about by a rapid increase 
in credit growth. We also find that banks that open more branches increase their revenue. Thus, the 
State Bank of Vietnam should consider introducing policies to enhance the development of commercial 
banks to raise competition and revenue in the banking system. 
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Table 1: The number of commercial banks from 1990 to 200917 
Type of banks 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
State owned commercial banks  4 4 5 5 5 
Non-state owned commercial banks      
                  Joint stock commercial banks  0 36 39 37 37 
                  Branches of foreign banks  0 18 26 31 48 
                  Joint venture commercial banks  0 4 5 5 6 
                  Foreign commercial banks  0 0 0 0 5 
Total 4 62 75 78 101 
Sources: Dufhues (2003), SBV (2005, 2008, 2009) and VCSC (2008). 
 
 
Table 2: Data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese commercial banks (state owned 
commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 to 2009 (Unit: 1,000 Vietnamese Dong) 
Year Bank type Loans Assets Deposits  Capital Non-performing 
loans 
1999 
 SOCBs     72,142,247      134,890,858       87,326,439       5,468,772  10.78% 
 Non-SOCBs     35,899,360        58,871,839       30,293,986       9,284,887  N/A 
2000 
 SOCBs   108,422,565      200,433,947     127,033,459       5,413,772  10.02% 
 Non-SOCBs     41,231,535        75,856,994       43,321,781     10,139,627  9.42% 
2001 
 SOCBs   135,647,621      247,151,769     160,738,302       5,421,134  8.83% 
 Non-SOCBs     45,466,715        88,614,974       51,759,565     10,953,034  7.81% 
2002 
 SOCBs   165,921,733      286,860,920     189,313,313     10,061,113  7.62% 
 Non-SOCBs     55,296,802      102,590,591       63,658,203     11,152,585  5.41% 
2003 
 SOCBs   214,481,096      367,813,825     237,485,761     14,516,916  5.13% 
 Non-SOCBs     74,068,790      130,337,981       79,255,399     12,398,334  3.57% 
2004 
 SOCBs   295,738,175      468,341,918     311,681,861     17,362,940  2.92% 
 Non-SOCBs   103,563,777      183,404,071     109,681,322     14,860,054  2.26% 
2005 
 SOCBs   380,850,503      603,540,889     406,957,181     18,429,980  3.81% 
 Non-SOCBs   143,449,737      261,307,537     144,499,838     20,009,805  1.42% 
2006 
 SOCBs   435,695,864      731,657,400     524,533,245     18,777,200  3.19% 
 Non-SOCBs   212,097,344      430,755,234     229,411,786     35,578,494  1.29% 
2007 
 SOCBs   564,677,195      904,004,852     652,913,108     30,091,997  1.87% 
 Non-SOCBs   420,184,441      903,961,807     456,920,152     66,066,418  0.94% 
2008 
 SOCBs   671,732,670   1,078,729,233     775,560,005     39,279,325  2.47% 
 Non-SOCBs   534,692,051   1,097,675,565     593,628,040   103,923,040  1.62% 
200918 
 SOCBs   903,718,777   1,320,357,324     869,410,909     61,293,664  N/A 
 Non-SOCBs   560,883,667   1,210,244,318     680,665,451   115,192,318  N/A 
Note: SOCBs: State owned commercial banks; Non-SOCBs: Non-state owned commercial banks. Sources: SBV (2009); Financial statements 
of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks. 
 
                                                 
17 Beside these commercial banks, there are also the Social Policy Bank and Vietnam Development Bank which are operating as non-profit 
institutions. 
18 We could not collect data of the North Asia Commercial Bank and Vinasiam Bank in 2009. 
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Table 3: Fixed-effects estimations for the full sample (Observations = 376) 
 With assets and with current input prices Without assets and with current input prices 
 H-statistics E-statistics H-statistics E-statistics 
 LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) LN(REV) LN(INT) LN(1+PBT/TA) 
Intercept 0.733 
(1.558) 
1.051** 
(2.207) 
0.036 
(1.047) 
10.556*** 
(21.510) 
10.904*** 
(22.090) 
-0.005 
(-0.240) 
LN(PE/TE) 0.130** 
(2.253) 
0.071 
(1.219) 
0.005 
(1.216) 
0.413*** 
(4.102) 
0.355*** 
(3.5035) 
0.004 
(0.953) 
LN(IE/FF) 0.395*** 
(11.759) 
0.500*** 
(14.731) 
0.001 
(0.405) 
0.480*** 
(8.117 
0.586*** 
(9.849) 
0.001 
(0.261) 
LN(CE/FA) 0.064*** 
(2.537) 
0.045* 
(1.771392) 
0.001 
(0.728692) 
0.062 
(1.398) 
0.044 
(0.9714) 
0.001 
(0.731) 
TC/TA 0.432*** 
(5.065) 
0.432*** 
(5.005) 
0.041*** 
(6.688) 
-0.662*** 
(-5.054) 
-0.666*** 
(-5.0516) 
0.0459*** 
(8.533) 
CL/CD -0.01342 
(-1.429) 
-0.009 
(-0.936) 
-0.001 
(-0.737) 
-0.021 
(-1.259) 
-0.016 
(-0.982) 
-0.000 
(-0.691) 
LN(TA) -0.195*** 
(-6.275) 
-0.193*** 
(-6.125) 
-0.003 
(-1.471)    
LN(BR) 0.145*** 
(3.721) 
0.152*** 
(3.856) 
0.003 
(1.124) 
0.740*** 
(13.286) 
0.749*** 
(13.368) 
0.001 
(0.315) 
R2 0.725 0.758 0.497 0.961 0.961 0.494 
Adj. R2 0.669 0.708 0.394 0.953 0.953 0.392 
1
0H  
3.961*** 
Reject 
3.430*** 
Reject 
1.680*** 
Reject 
19.286*** 
Reject 
18.679*** 
Reject 
1.629*** 
Reject 
2
0H  
3.854*** 
Reject 
3.166*** 
Reject 
1.861*** 
Reject 
17.022*** 
Reject 
16.278*** 
Reject 
1.819*** 
Reject 
H-sta. [E-sta.] 0.589 0.617 [0.007] 0.956 0.984 [0.006] 
Ho: H=0 77.593*** 
Reject 
83.076*** 
Reject 
2.345 
Accept 
68.154*** 
Reject 
71.480*** 
Reject 
1.552 
Accept 
Ho: H=1 37.645*** 
Reject 
31.999*** 
Reject 
--- 0.146 
Accept 
0.018 
Accept 
--- 
F-statistic 12.827*** 15.238*** 4.812*** 122.817*** 122.926*** 4.836*** 
 With assets and with lagged input prices Without assets and with lagged input prices 
 H-statistics E-statistics H-statistics E-statistics 
 LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) LN(REV) LN(INT) LN(1+PBT/TA) 
Intercept 0.681 
(1.034) 
0.683 
(0.945) 
0.029 
(0.711) 
11.233*** 
(20.302) 
11.485*** 
(19.670) 
-0.034 
(-1.504) 
LN(PE/TE)(t-1) 0.066 
(0.913) 
-0.004 
(-0.047) 
0.009 
(2.057) 
0.218* 
(1.950) 
0.151 
(1.281) 
0.008* 
(1.862) 
LN(IE/FF)(t-1) 0.082* 
(1.932) 
0.136*** 
(2.934) 
-0.003 
(-1.183) 
0.245*** 
(3.847) 
0.303*** 
(4.513) 
-0.004 
(-1.579) 
LN(CE/FA)(t-1) 0.012 
(0.376) 
-0.002 
(-0.065) 
-0.001 
(-0.569) 
-0.009 
(-0.192) 
-0.024 
(-0.467) 
-0.001 
(-0.503) 
TC/TA 0.240** 
(2.242) 
0.210* 
(1.787) 
0.033*** 
(4.882) 
-0.893*** 
(-6.489) 
-0.949*** 
(-6.541) 
0.040*** 
(7.042) 
CL/CD -0.072** 
(-2.333) 
-0.041 
(-1.203) 
-0.002 
(-1.179) 
-0.120** 
(-2.538) 
-0.090* 
(-1.802) 
-0.002 
(-1.028) 
LN(TA) -0.217*** 
(-5.304) 
-0.198*** 
(-4.422) 
-0.005* 
(-1.832)    
LN(BR) 0.079 
(1.593) 
0.065 
(1.183) 
0.003 
(1.053) 
0.624*** 
(9.922) 
0.622*** 
(9.375) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
R2 0.650 0.635 0.547 0.961 0.957 0.541 
Adj. R2 0.569 0.550 0.442 0.952 0.948 0.437 
1
0H  
3.363*** 
Reject 
1.904 
Accept 
1.736*** 
Reject 
16.318*** 
Reject 
14.782*** 
Reject 
1.684*** 
Reject 
2
0H  
4.299*** 
Reject 
85.161*** 
Reject 
2.044*** 
Reject 
14.486*** 
Reject 
13.2512*** 
Reject 
1.986*** 
Reject 
H-sta. [E-sta.] 0.160 0.130 [0.007] 0.453 0.430 [0.003] 
Ho: H=0 3.477* 
Accept 
1.904 
Accept 
0.909 
Accept 
12.136*** 
Reject 
9.814*** 
Reject 
0.401 
Accept 
Ho: H=1 95.566*** 
Reject 
85.161*** 
Reject 
--- 17.633*** 
Reject 
17.207*** 
Reject 
--- 
F-statistic 8.055*** 7.545*** 5.237*** 109.849*** 100.225*** 5.222*** 
Note: R2 denotes the coefficient of determination, Adj. R2 the adjusted coefficient of determination,
 
1
0H  is an F-test for the significance of cross-sectional 
fixed-effects, 
2
0H  is an F-test for the joint significance of cross-sectional and time-period fixed-effects and F-sta. tests the null that R2 is equal to zero. The 
variables’ coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) are reported in the table; *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level and * 
significance at the 10% level. Source for the data are the financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks.  
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Table 4. GMM 1-step system estimator (excluding assets and including lagged input prices) for the full sample 
 LN(REV) LN(INT) 
L1 LN(REV) 0.7498***  
 (9.705)  
   
L1 LN(INT)  0.8274*** 
  (8.215) 
L1 LN(PE/TE) -0.0755 -0.1709 
 (-0.5435) (-1.201) 
L1 LN(IE/FF) -0.2404*** -0.3327*** 
 (-3.077) (-3.651) 
L1 LN(CE/FA) -0.005 -0.0114 
 (-0.146) (-0.3096) 
TC/TA -0.1286 -0.03 
 (-0.6753) (-0.1454) 
CL/CD -0.0338 -0.0061 
 (-0.7207) (-0.1262) 
LN(TA)   
   
LN(BR) 0.2069*** 0.1441 
 (2.89) (1.62) 
   
constant 2.659*** 1.925** 
 (3.964) (2.182) 
Instruments 34 34 
Groups 46 46 
AR(1) 0.005***  0.009*** 
AR(2) 0.715*** Valid 0.757*** Valid 
Hansen  0.110*** Valid 0.107*** Valid 
H0 period FE 130.87*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
169.11*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
L1 OLS 0.8256 0.8420 
L1 period FE 0.7168 0.7642 
H-statistic 
 
-1.2825 
 
-2.9842 
 
H=0 -1.1217 
Accept 
-1.0133 
Accept 
H=1 -2.000*** 
Reject 
-1.3529 
Accept 
Wald test 12389.79 13839.51 
Obs. 327 327 
Note: Coefficients, t-statistics (round brackets) and probabilities (square brackets) are reported in the table; *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant 
at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks from 1999 to 2009. Time dummy 
variable are included in the estimated models, however, we do not report the coefficients of the variables to save space. 
 
